Fraude en chapter kodak

mismo caso kodak y kv pharmaceutic
mismo juez gropper

¿Se Bain y 9 Wall Street Empresas Conspirar para recortar Cotizaciones de compañías atacaron?

Viernes, 03 de mayo 2013 | Darwin Bondgraham

(Bain Capital es ahora famosa por haber sido fundada por el ex candidato presidencial republicano Mitt Romney, centro, cuyo Valor estimado es de $ 250 millones. Bain Capital es una de las 10 firmas de capital privado que defienden en sí en un caso civil que alega conspiraron para defraudar a los inversionistas. Esta foto es de 1984 Fuente:. WP )

El capital privado está a punto de embarcarse en una nueva era de las compras apalancadas para rivalizar con los de finales de 1980 y mediados de la década de 2000. Los financieros una vez derribados los gigantes corporativos como RJR Nabisco y y Harrah, y comidos de cientos de pequeñas empresas. Como Bain & Co. observó en su informe 2013 sobre el capital privado:

El hambre de la producción y la rápida erosión del "acantilado de refinanciación", han hecho que los mercados de deuda más boyante de lo que han sido en muchos años. Múltiplos de apalancamiento actual rival, los que están en el pico de 2007, y el costo de la deuda es cerca de mínimos históricos.

En otras palabras, es barato pedir prestado el dinero necesario para lanzar ataques. Hay "polvo seco" en los barriles de las casas de inversión, como se suele decir, el dinero ocioso que está en busca de rendimientos más grandes que lo que es posible en los mercados de acciones y bonos. Otra era de adquisiciones se traduciría en toda la carnicería asociado con capital privado - despidos masivos, la liquidación de activos de las empresas con deuda ensillado, esquemas masivos de evasión fiscal, una mayor desigualdad de la riqueza, y así sucesivamente.

Un caso poco conocido contra tiendas buyout más grandes del mundo se encamina a un juicio y el resultado podría costar a los financieros más elitistas miles de millones y miles de millones en el mundo.

El capital privado se fue detrás de una gran cantidad de heridos y muertos en la estela de los dos blitzkriegs anteriores. La mayoría de las víctimas eran y son impotentes para impedir el regreso de los hombres del dinero y nada ha cambiado en virtud de la ley, o en la política, en los últimos 20 años para evitar una tercera compra compulsiva de deuda de ebriedad.

Sin embargo, hay algunos, que están atacando el privilegio y el poder del capital privado.

Sólo Miembros
A finales de 2007, las pensiones de la ciudad de Detroit y Omaha, junto con los inversores individuales, presentaron una moonshot de una demanda colectiva en la corte federal en Massachusetts contra 10 de las mayores empresas de capital privado.

El caso se conoce como Dahl v Bain .

Kirk Dahl, un médico de Michigan que tiene ahora la distinción de tener su nombre legalmente titulado en una de las mayores demandas antimonopolio de la historia, dice que fue engañado en varias ofertas de compra. Bain no es otro que fue el centro neurálgico de rescisión de Mitt Romney.

Los demandantes alegan que las empresas más grandes de capital privado conspiraron para bajar los precios de las acciones de las empresas que fueron atacados en el auge de compra de participaciones a mediados de los años 2000. Los demandantes afirman que las empresas más grandes - TPG, KKR, Blackstone, Apollo, Bain, Carlyle, Providence Equity Partners, Silver Lake, Thomas H. Lee, y una filial de Goldman Sachs-optó por acatar "club de la etiqueta" para suprimir la competencia fuera de la mayores adquisiciones. "Etiqueta Club" es una frase que se utiliza en un correo electrónico interno para describir el tenor de la conspiración. Piense en el club de los hombres, donde la testosterona impulsa visión para los negocios como a los modelos de computadora y la diligencia debida.

Club de la etiqueta implicaba un acuerdo tácito sobre todo a no "saltar" una ofertas de los otros con las ofertas de la competencia, pero en lugar de hacer una oferta en conjunto a fin de repartir alrededor de las lucrativas ganancias que se harán a partir de adquisiciones. Estas ganancias fueron mayores gracias a los precios de las acciones reducidos jugadores de capital privado pagan debido al hecho de que no había ninguna competencia significativa desde el puñado de otras empresas lo suficientemente grandes como para montar varios miles de millones de dólares en redadas empresas megacapitalización.

La presunta conspiración fue posible porque el mundo planeta-a horcajadas de capital privado es muy pequeño en la parte superior. Sólo unas pocas docenas de empresas cuentan con el capital necesario y pueden tomar prestadas las asombrosas sumas de dinero necesarias para tener miles de millones de dólares de las empresas privadas. Estos hombres, casi todos ellos hombres blancos que viven alrededor de Nueva York, Boston y San Francisco, vuelan en sus jets privados a los mismos recursos de la isla privada y los destinos mundiales de la élite de lujo. Invierten en uno de los otros fondos y equipos deportivos co-propios como aficiones. Lo llaman el uno al otro a todas horas para charlar sobre ofertas comerciales y ping entre sí con los e-mails concisas llenos de oscuras siglas y apodos amistosos. Juegan en los mismos clubes sociales de elite y cenar juntos. Ellos envían a sus hijos a las mismas escuelas privadas superiores. Usted consigue la idea.

Esta manipulación secreta de mercado significa que los accionistas de las empresas allanadas recibieron menos por sus acciones. Debido a que los inversores institucionales, incluidas las pensiones, fondos mutuos, 401K, y otros fondos de ahorro, son propietarias de las apuestas más grandes de las empresas más negociadas en bolsa, una presunta conspiración para hacer bajar los precios de las acciones en las adquisiciones engañado potencialmente millones de jubilados y las familias. Está en juego en los 17 ofertas de buyout en el corazón de Dahl v Bain son cientos de miles de millones de dólares.

Los secretos del 'club de la etiqueta'
Entre 2008 y 2012, los demandantes resistido un bombardeo de mociones para retrasar y desestimar el caso. "Hemos tenido rondas de los pedidos de desestimación," Christopher Burke, un litigantes antimonopolio, me dijo. Burke es un abogado con el de Scott & Scott firma de abogados con sede en San Diego. Él dijo que las firmas de capital privado "acaban de rociado de dinero en el proceso."

"Cada firma en blanco y zapato que puedas imaginar está de su lado trata de gente muy rica -... Multimillonarios No les gusta que rendir cuentas o garner publicidad no deseada Ellos son los beneficiarios de un sistema fiscal que subsidia lo que hacen, carga hasta empresas con deuda, por lo que los pagos de intereses de esa deuda, para obtener beneficios para sí mismos y sus inversores ".

¿Se firmas de capital privado más grandes de Wall Street, incluyendo Bain de Mitt Romney, conspiran para hacer bajar los precios de acciones de las empresas que compraron a cabo a mediados de la década de 2000?

Burke y sus colegas sobrevivieron mociones para desestimar y llegaron a la fase de descubrimiento en mayo del 2010. Discovery en este caso ha generado una mirada sin precedentes en el funcionamiento interno y las deliberaciones de una elite mundial. Los acusados ​​toser más de 5,6 millones de documentos y los amos del universo se vieron obligados a someterse a las deposiciones. Pero sus abogados lograron sellar casi toda la evidencia generada por el caso, argumentando que la divulgación podría revelar secretos comerciales de propiedad.

"Tenga en cuenta que han compartido toda esta información entre sí", dijo Burke. "Ahora dicen que es secretos competitivos? La práctica normal para ellos es compartir información, así que es un poco ingenuos para que discutan esto."

Los únicos atisbos que tenemos son las referencias en las quejas modificados (especialmente del caso quinta demanda enmendada ) y en transcripciones de la corte (la última vez 18 de diciembre 2012 y 19 de diciembre 2012 ). Incluso esto casi nunca vio la luz del día. Los abogados que representan a The New York Times tuvo que desclasificar la Demanda Modificada quinto.

Entre los bits más comprometedoras de la información son las declaraciones hechas por los negociantes en los e-mails con los otros. Son ilustrativos de su "club de la etiqueta" es un intercambio entre Blackstone Hamilton James y de KKR George Roberts después de Blackstone acordó no competir por la compra de participaciones de Hospital Corporation of America por $ 21 mil millones en 2006. James escribió:

Esas admisiones en un par de correos electrónicos enterrados en las correspondencias prolíficos entre las empresas, inclinaron la balanza. En uno, un alto ejecutivo de Carlyle comentó asunto con total naturalidad que "KKR pidió a la industria a dimitir en HCA." Un segundo comunicado de Blackstone describió cómo KKR acatado "club de etiqueta" en alejándose de la oferta de Blackstone para otro company: "Henry Kravis [de KKR] acaba de llamar para decir felicitaciones y que estaban de pie abajo porque él me había dicho antes que no saltarían a un acuerdo firmado de los nuestros."

"En el recuento de HCA", explicó Burke, "Bain y KKR y Merrill Lynch se reunieron y llegaron a un acuerdo del resto de las principales firmas de capital privado para no pujar por HCA."

Los demandantes pueden haber atrapado a los peces gordos de private equity in fraganti en la supresión de la competencia en la compra de HCA. Va a ser más difícil para ellos para demostrar una conspiración global más amplia entre todas las 10 firmas de capital privado para asignar el mercado más amplio para las adquisiciones megacapitalización a mediados de la década de 2000. El caso seguramente generará información privilegiada más jugosa en las operaciones de capital privado, y vamos a estar siguiéndolo.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Darwin Bondgraham es sociólogo y periodista que escribe sobre economía política. Sus escritos han aparecido en Counterpunch , Truthout , Z Revista y otros. Síguelo @ DarwinBondGraham y @ WashSpec .

seria bueno renviar este ultimo enlase a los foros en busca de apollo

Did Bain and 9 Wall Street Firms Conspire to Slash Stock Prices of Companies They Raided?
Friday, 03 May 2013 | Darwin Bondgraham

(Bain Capital is now famous for being founded by former Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney, center, whose estimated worth is $250 million. Bain Capital is one of 10 private-equity firms defending itself in a civil case that alleges they conspired to defraud investors. This photo is from 1984. Source: WP)

Private equity is poised to embark on a new era of leveraged buyouts to rival those of the late 1980s and mid-2000s. Financiers once toppled corporate giants like RJR Nabisco and and Harrah's, and devoured hundreds of small companies. As Bain & Co. observed in its 2013 report on private equity:

The hunger for yield and the rapid erosion of the “refinancing cliff” have made the debt markets more buoyant than they have been in many years. Current leverage multiples rival those at the peak of 2007, and the cost of debt is near record lows.

In other words, it's cheap to borrow money needed to launch raids. There's "dry powder" in the kegs of the investment houses, as they say, idle money that's in search of bigger returns than what's possible in the stock and bond markets. Another era of buyouts would result in all the carnage associated with private equity -- mass layoffs, asset stripping of debt-saddled companies, massive tax avoidance schemes, greater wealth inequality, and so on.

A little known case against the world's biggest buyout shops is heading to trial and the outcome could cost the world's most elite financiers billions and billions.

Private equity left behind a lot of wounded and dead in the wake of the two previous blitzkriegs. Most victims were and are powerless to prevent a return of the money men and nothing has changed under the law, or in politics, over the past 20 years to prevent a third debt-drunken buyout binge.

There are some, however, who are attacking private equity's privilege and power.

Members only
In late 2007, the city pensions of Detroit and Omaha, together with individual investors, filed a moonshot of a class-action lawsuit in federal court in Massachusetts against 10 of the largest private equity firms.

The case is known as Dahl v. Bain.

Kirk Dahl, a Michigan doctor who now has the distinction of having his name legally headlined in one of the largest anti-trust lawsuits in history, says he was cheated in several buyout deals. Bain is none other than Mitt Romney's former buyout powerhouse.

The plaintiffs allege that the biggest private-equity firms conspired to depress share prices of corporations that were targeted in the mid-2000s buyout boom. Plaintiffs claim the biggest firms — TPG, KKR, Blackstone, Apollo, Bain, Carlyle, Providence Equity Partners, Silver Lake, Thomas H. Lee, and a Goldman Sachs subsidiary— chose to abide by "club etiquette" to suppress outside competition for the biggest takeovers. "Club etiquette" is a phrase used in an internal e-mail to describe the conspiracy's tenor. Think men's club, where testosterone drives business acumen as much as computer models and due diligence.

Club etiquette entailed a mostly unspoken agreement not to "jump" one another's deals with competing bids, but instead to bid together so as to spread around the lucrative profits to be made from buyouts. These profits were higher thanks to the discounted share prices private equity players paid due to the fact that there was no significant competition from the handful of other firms large enough to mount multi-billion dollar raids on mega-cap companies.

The alleged conspiracy was possible because the planet-straddling world of private equity is quite small at the top. Only a few dozen firms have the necessary equity and can borrow the staggering sums of money needed to take multi-billion dollar companies private. These men, virtually all of them white men who live around New York, Boston, and San Francisco, fly in their private jets to the same private island resorts and global destinations of the luxury elite. They invest in one another's funds and co-own sports teams as hobbies. They call one another at all hours to chat about business deals and ping one another with pithy e-mails filled with obscure acronyms and friendly nicknames. They play in the same elite social clubs and dine together. They send their children to the same top private schools. You get the idea.

This secret market manipulation meant that shareholders of raided companies received less for their stock. Because institutional investors, including pensions, mutual funds, 401Ks, and other savings funds, own the largest stakes in most publicly traded corporations, an alleged conspiracy to depress share prices in buyouts cheated potentially millions of retirees and families. At stake in the 17 buyout deals at the heart of Dahl v. Bain are hundreds of billions of dollars.

The secrets of 'club etiquette'
Between 2008 and 2012, the plaintiffs weathered a barrage of motions to delay and dismiss the case. "We've had rounds of motions to dismiss," Christopher Burke, an antitrust litigators, told me. Burke is a lawyer with the San Diego-based Scott & Scott law firm. He said the private equity firms "have just sprayed money at the process."

"Every white-shoe firm you can imagine is on their side. These are very rich people — billionaires. They don't like to be held accountable or garner unwanted publicity. They are the beneficiaries of a tax system that subsidizes what they do, loading up companies with debt, making interest payments on that debt, to obtain profits for themselves and their investors."

Did Wall Street's biggest private-equity firms, including Mitt Romney's Bain, conspire to depress stock prices of corporations they bought out in the mid-2000s?

Burke and his colleagues survived motions to dismiss and reached the discovery phase in May of 2010. Discovery in this case has generated an unprecedented look into the inner-workings and deliberations of an elite world. The defendants coughed up more than 5.6 million documents and the masters of the universe were forced to submit to depositions. But their lawyers succeeded in sealing nearly all of the evidence generated by the case, arguing that disclosure would reveal proprietary trade secrets.

"Keep in mind they've shared all this info with one another," Burke said. "Now they say it's competitive secrets? The normal practice for them is to share information, so it's a little disingenuous for them to argue this."

The only glimpses we have are references in the amended complaints (especially the case's 5th Amended Complaint) and in court transcripts (most recently Dec. 18, 2012, and Dec. 19, 2012). Even this almost never saw the light of day. Lawyers representing The New York Times had to to unseal the 5th Amended Complaint.

Among the more incriminating bits of information are statements made by dealmakers in e-mails with one another. Illustrative of their "club etiquette" is an exchange between Blackstone's Hamilton James and KKR's George Roberts after Blackstone agreed not to compete for the buyout of Hospital Corporation of America for $21 billion in 2006. James wrote:

"Thx for the call George. I talked to Henry [Kravis] Friday night and he was good enough to call Steve [Schwarzman] Saturday. We would much rather work with you guys than against you. Together we can be unstoppable but in opposition we can cost each other a lot of money."

Hamilton James is worth about $1.1 billion; George Roberts about $4.1 billion. These men made a lot of this cash during the alleged conspiratorial era under examination by the court in Dahl v. Bain.

At stake, hundreds of billions of dollars
Bringing their case under the Sherman Act's antitrust provisions has been challenging for the plaintiffs. Proving a conspiracy among powerful finance capitalists is made more difficult because their money is sheltered in limited partnerships and private corporations, many of them incorporated offshore, and therefore secret. Without a smoking gun, the plaintiffs in antitrust cases must build their argument around the totality of evidence, statements, and broader context.

In March, the plaintiffs prevailed against a motion for summary judgement in which the defendants sought to throw out the entire case. The judge ruled that there is sufficient evidence to infer the presence of an over-arching conspiracy among the private equity firms to suppress share prices by not "jumping" one another's deals. The judge further ruled that with respect to the takeover of HCA, the evidence is strong enough to proceed with an individual count of conspiracy and antitrust activity.

Judge: The evidence, taken all together, does suggest a vast Wall Street conspiracy.

According to Judge Edward F. Harrington:

The evidence establishes that each Remaining HCA Defendant showed interest in the HCA transaction, but promptly “stepped down” from making a topping bid within 48 hours of the commencement of the fifty-day “go-shop” period. The evidence further shows that the Remaining HCA Defendants communicated their decision to “step down” on HCA to KKR or Bain within ninety-six hours of the commencement of the “go shop” period and subsequently lamented having forgone a potentially lucrative deal. While this uniform conduct on the part of the Remaining HCA Defendants would not, on its own, support an inference of a conspiracy as to HCA, in combination with at least two statements made by executives of the Remaining HCA Defendants, it does support such an inference.

Those admissions in a couple of e-mails buried in the prolific correspondences between the firms, tipped the scale. In one, a top a executive at Carlyle remarked matter-of-factly that “KKR asked the industry to step down on HCA.” A second statement from Blackstone described how KKR abided by "club etiquette" in backing away from Blackstone's bid for another company: "Henry Kravis [of KKR] just called to say congratulations and that they were standing down because he had told me before they would not jump a signed deal of ours."

"In the HCA count," explained Burke, "Bain and KKR and Merrill Lynch got together and got an agreement from the rest of the major private equity firms to not bid on HCA."

The plaintiffs may have caught the private equity big shots red-handed in suppressing competition on the HCA buyout. It's going to be tougher for them to prove a broader overarching conspiracy among all 10 private equity firms to allocate the broader market for mega-cap buyouts in the mid-2000s. The case will surely generate more juicy inside information on the operations of private equity, and we'll be following it.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Darwin Bondgraham is a sociologist and journalist who writes about political economy. His writing has appeared in Counterpunch, Truthout, Z Magazine and others. Follow him @DarwinBondGraham and @WashSpec.

https://www.finalternatives.com/node/25699

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Collusion Settlement Could Cost P.E. Firms More Than $1B

Jan 3 2014 | 11:46am ET

Shareholders of eight companies acquired by 11 major private equity firms are ready to hold the p.e. firms' feet to the fire in settlement talks.

The investors have accused the firms, including Blackstone Group, Bain Capital, Carlyle Group, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts and TPG Capital of collusion, working together to drive down the prices they paid for companies. Last month, a judge scheduled the trial for Nov. 3, and in March, the plaintiffs are expected to seek class-action status.

A court in March refused the firms' 10th dismissal bid, ruling that there was simply too much evidence of improper behavior to sink the lawsuit, which was initially filed in 2007.

If the firms want to avoid an embarrassing trial, however, it's going to cost them big. According to the New York Post, the shareholders will demand in excess of $1 billion to go away. "I think there was a time the plaintiffs would have settled for $1 billion, but that time had passed," a source told the tabloid.

The p.e. firms are not yet ready to settle, although they told U.S. District Judge William Young last month that they had employed a private mediator and spoken several times. There is no indication that the sides are close to a deal.

The lawsuit covers eight buyouts worth $170 billion. The plaintiffs allege that the firms agreed not to engage in bidding wars between 2004 and 2008, citing e-mails between top executives at the time. In one, Blackstone Group President Hamilton James wrote that KKR's Henry Kravis had said "they would not jump a signed deal of ours." James also allegedly wrote to KKR's George Roberts, "Together we can be unstoppable but in opposition we can cost each other a lot of money."

Roberts said he "agreed."

At least year's dismissal hearing, U.S. District Judge Edward Harrington also expressed concern with KKR's request that rivals "step down" on a buyout

Kodak, ex-shareholders in court over stock fight

Matthew Daneman, Staff writer 5:23 p.m. EST January 15, 2014

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Some Eastman Kodak Co. shareholders who want compensation for losing their stock are heading to federal bankruptcy court this week, fighting a company objection to their claims.

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Allan Gropper is scheduled to hear arguments Thursday from various shareholders who have filed a claim against Kodak and now are objecting to the company's efforts to get those claims declared null and void.

Throughout its bankruptcy and since exiting Chapter 11 in September, Kodak has regularly filed objections in U.S. Bankruptcy Court, essentially saying it doesn't owe anything to this particular party seeking money, and here's why. The deadline for the last of those claims was Oct. 18. In November and December, Kodak filed a series of objections to claims with lists of hundreds of former shareholders who had filed claims asking to be compensated for their lost stock.

Some of those shareholders are objecting to Kodak's objections.

"The court would not have allowed them to emerge from bankruptcy if they had no assets," Kodak shareholder James M Brennan of Micanopy, Fla., wrote the court in December. "All I want is my percentage share of the sale price of the assets of Eastman Kodak Co."

"I am a schoolteacher who had faith in Kodak and I would like my claim to be allowed for financial retirement savings," Mary S. Servey of Riverview, Mich., hand wrote in her objection in December.

"When management canceled the stock, I did not get reimbursed or refunded my investment money," wrote Valentin Ortega of Sanger, Calif., who has a roughly $284,000 claim against the company. "I did not even get the right to vote or any kind of notice ... that the original stock was going to cancel. Management is not satisfied with overcoming all the obstacles during restructuring and living the job of their recent successes. They also want to cut me out and other creditors or investors and not pay us our capital investment that we have invested in the company."

And Tommy Robinson Sr. of Cumberland, Md., wrote that he bought 2,000 shares over the past decade. "Eastman Kodak is not broke and still do own a great majority of property, land and buildings that have value so to deny (the claim for $17,169) would be a travesty of justice."

However, those arguments likely will not carry any water legally. U.S. bankruptcy law holds that when a bankrupt company is repaying its various creditors, shareholders are last in line. Only after everyone else, such as suppliers, is made whole do the actual owners get anything.

In Kodak's case, the various unsecured creditors, such as suppliers, are far from being made whole. Most of its unsecured creditors were paid 4 to 5 cents on the dollar for their IOUs, and many of them bought new shares in the company in a rights offering. The new stock is up 77 percent since it began trading in September and closed Wednesday at $32.99 a share.

In a letter dated Jan. 10 to former shareholders who had filed a claim, Kodak legal counsel Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor wrote that while "We ... are certainly sympathetic to your situation," it reiterated what the court approved on Aug. 23 — a reorganization plan for getting out of bankruptcy that explicitly says no shareholders will get any compensation.

The hearing on Kodak's objections to the shareholder claims, and the shareholder objections to the objection, is scheduled for 11 a.m. in Gropper's Manhattan courtroom.

[email protected]

Twitter.com/mdaneman

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pero no dicen nada de que gropper vendio las filiales confidencialmente algo ilegal no tiene comptencia al no ser parte del chapter 11
2) tampoco esta que william Parret era directo de kodak encargado de auditorias pero tambien lo era de blackstne principal beneficiario
3)cuando vendiero las patentes por 528 millones por que no se les pago a acreedores enn posecion que se les devia 375 millones y con eso es pagaban si ellos aseptaron pagar bonos a largo plazo es ovio que ellos no querian pago si no la empresa
4) existe evidencia de que bienes valian mas patentes no estan en balance y devoluciones de impuestos por 3 billones de dolares
5)donde esta el reactor nuclear de kodak
http://www.elobservador.com.uy/noticia/224097/kodak-tenia-un-reactor-nuclear-en-su-sede-de-nueva-york/
segun informacion que ley hase un tiempo ese reactor vale 2 billones por lo menos
pero ques ea secreta ubicacion pero no el valor y vale mucho

15 de noviembre

12:52a.m. 2013

 Imprimir este artículo  compartirlo con los amigos

15 de noviembre

12:52a.m. 2013

 Imprimir este artículo  compartirlo con los amigos