en China directamente ya hemos comentado que no es posible comprar. Creo que hay una conexión entre las bolsas chinas y Hong Kong, pero es para que los chinos puedan comprar acciones cotizadas en Hong Kong.
Y el problema al final es la posibilidad de un fraude, a lo que los chinos son muy dados, o la intervención del partido comunista en cualquier empresa, que pueden cargársela de un día para otro. Esto puede pasar con independencia de donde cotice.
Copio el comentario sobre este tema que acabo de ver en la carta de un gestor, Arisaig, indicando que solo tiene acciones que estén cotizando también en Hong Kong y que los problemas pueden estar en la parte administrativa (moverlas de un mercado a otro, lo que comenté en un mensaje anterior) y que empresas chinas por debajo de un nivel de capitalización no pueden cotizar en Hong Kong, lo que puede dejar a alguna en el limbo si finalmente les echan de las bolsas de EE.UU. También habla de la estructura de vehículos (Variable interest entities) que comentamos tienen Alibaba y otras. Este gestor ya ha traspasado sus ADRs de JD.com a acciones en Hong Kong:
the threat of US regulatory action has emerged against New York‐listed Chinese
stocks. We don’t believe there is a significant threat to the VIE structure of many of these listings (whereby a Cayman entity enters into contractual relationships with the Chinese business, and the Cayman vehicle is the one publicly listed in order to evade Chinese foreign ownership restrictions).
VIEs have helped numerous Chinese companies achieve international leadership by providing them access to foreign capital. Disrupting this arrangement would clearly run contrary to Chinese economic interests.
There does exist the possibility that such companies are banned from listing on the US markets and/or US institutional money is prohibited from investing in them. Fraud cases such as Luckin’ Coffee and GSX have helped to add fuel to the geopolitical fires. Frankly, it is hard to disagree with those making the argument that the average US investor is hopelessly unprotected by local regulation against the fact that goings‐on in China often seem to differ substantially from what is presented in an SEC filing.
In case of a sudden clampdown, we take some comfort from the fact that the vast majority of our Chinese investments are either A‐shares or Hong Kong listings. We had one US‐listed Chinese holding,
JD.com, which has recently undergone a dual listing in Hong Kong. We have now managed to convert our US ADRs into Hong Kong shares. This is not to say that a Luckin’ Coffee incident could never happen to a local listing (even Germany is not immune to multi‐billion‐dollar blowouts). But shifting to Hong Kong removes the immediate ‘technical’ threat to our investments. Any regulatory action may also be
accompanied by a demand that US investors divest from their HK‐listed holdings too, but evidence so far suggests that Chinese domestic demand for shares is more than sufficient to fill such a void, particularly for those shares included on the HK‐Shanghai stock connect.
As China uses the cover of COVID to tighten its grip on Hong Kong, it may appear that by converting our ADR we are simply walking out of one geopolitical problem into another. Again, we see little rationale for China to undermine the international financial clout of the city. We trust that the management of Alibaba, JD.com, NetEase, Yum China and all others who are rushing to list in this market, are doing so with tacit approval of the authorities. We are lucky that all the companies we are interested in are eligible for Hong Kong listings (revenues above ~USD1.3bn) – smaller cap ADRs are
more likely to be left in the limbo of being banned from the US with no Hong Kong escape route.
More meaningful to us than the short‐term administrative burden of ADR conversion, are the longtermimplications of apparent decoupling between the world’s two largest economies
