:) :) :) me dice un pajarito que las van a seguir tirando...
igual hay que ponerse Cortos :) :) :)
Hay que divertido es esto de estar invertido en WAMU ¿verdad?
Ya solo falta que Manzana venga a dar la puntilla con la bola de cristal para poner la guinda al pastel.
Si claaaaro, las preferentes estan por las nubes. Jajaja
Mas vale pajarito bien informado que ciento volando. ;-)
http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=68089554#
Esta vez no vamos a saber absolutamente nada hasta 7 noviembre como primera fecha.
After 3+ years of following this case I think it is impossible to deny that there is a coverup being attempted regarding the sale and seizure of WaMu as well as the disposal of the assets.
This coverup would be impossible without a cooperative judge. Her refusal to allow discovery of JPM, the FDIC and the actions regarding the transfer and disposal of assets post petition is the biggest hinderance to a fair and quick resolution of this case.
All of the other actions by her to keep equity on life support is just window dressing including the lates mediation charade. She knows what would get this case resolved but she refuses to do so and she apparently intends to continue protecting the guilty parties with the equitable mootness threat.
I know some will slam me for this opinion and point to all of the window dressing decisions she has made that prevented the debtors and their allies from outright killing equity in broad daylight. But those are simply diversions.
Without the ability to carry forward litigation against the real criminals the best we can hope for is a percentage of face for the preferreds and nothing for commons.
I am feeling less optimistic since listening to the podcast by Rochelle on Bloomberg in which he seems to think the equitable mootness threat is very real.
If so, the EC, even though they have done a very good job up until this point, must conduct a scorcched earth campaign in the courts to thwart Walrath's attempt to brush the real criminal acts under the rug.
Walrath must not be allowed to continue to protect JPM and the FDIC.
Well, we've got at least until discovery is completed, assuming the SNs don't settle through mediation. If they do, then WMI will simply adjust the plan (including the GSA) to incorporate the changes wrought through mediation. Nevertheless, even in the most rosy scenario of a full $3B disgorgement, we still have the problem of $4.5B in front of commons. Even if we also got the $3.2B in refunds out of JPM ($2.4B) and the FDIC ($800MM) there would still be a $1.3B shortfall (nearly 20%), and I don't see TPS helping commons. Why should they? They have a 53/47 majority based on their holdings of $4B of the $7.5B, and many retail preferred holders would join them. Of course, the EC may have worked out a deal that if equity gets to a certain threshold, TPS will allow commons to share in any profits in the new company. That however, is speculation. In any event, I very much doubt TPS would give away all equity to commons in the event of a total payoff. The TPS are held by hedge funds, and they make money by leveraging small investments into spectacular gains. If there is a deficiency, it will be exchanged for a substantial portion of the reorganized entity's equity, otherwise commons get nothing. It's simply naive to think they'd do otherwise.
I listened to Bill Rochelle's podcast, and he puts equity's position in very clear terms. He says that equitable mootness WILL occur unless Walrath's order can be stayed. I've said the same thing many times, and as far as I know there are only two ways of avoiding this: (1) the D.C. withdraws the reference to the extent that Walrath is prohibited from entering a confirmation order until the appeal is determined; or (2) the EC (or a pro se shareholder) gets a writ of mandamus pursuant to FRAP 21(a) to permit the 3d Cir. to hear the appeal that certainly won't get to Judge Sleet in time.
When I say 'in time' I mean EXACTLY what Rochelle says when he says the plan will be implemented immediately after Walrath's signs the confirmation order. Walrath knew when she denied the EC's request to appeal to the 3d Cir. that so doing would put equity in the backlog for access to the District Court. I think equity can make a case to the 3d Cir. that the U.S. Constitution does not permit a litigant to lose his right to appeal because of a lack of judicial resources. Equitable mootness due to the backlog is a violation of equity's right to due process.
However, even if there were no backlog such that an appeal could be heard within days of confirmation, equity's due process rights would still be violated by Weil's conflict of interest because Rosen/WMI would INSTANTANEOUSLY distribute the money to the creditors, effectively mooting the EC appeal. (It is also my conjecture that the 'disbursement' would be a legal formality, only: the money would be paid to accounts for the benefit of the creditors, and immediately put in a fund that would be used to capitalize a new hedge fund run by the SNs. I'll say it again, the reinsurance business is just a red herring.)
In my view, the very issuance of a confirmation order is a denial of the EC's (and any individual equity holder's) due process rights. The appeal was timely filed, and equity has the right to have a higher court review Walrath's ruling before equity's rights are lost forever. That, in my opinion, is manifest injustice (see FRAP 21(a): http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frap/ru... as the U.S. Constitution does not permit a litigant's right to appeal to be lost because of either lack of judicial resources (i.e., the 2-3 year wait to get before Judge Sleet) or the breach of fiduciary duty by its counsel (i.e., Rosen's move to immediately implement the confirmation order). (I think an inference of breach of fiduciary duty can be supported by providing the court with a copy of the retainer agreement WMI signed with JPM, and the testimony from the first confirmation hearing that Weil, not Quinn, was running the plan process. I think it may be established that the apparent conflict of interest was not removed by Quinn's retention.)
We have nothing to lose by such a move. If the 3d Cir. says 'no', we're no worse off. If it says 'yes', then we kill off the possibility of equitable mootness. The forgoing could be effected by the EC or a pro se shareholder (here's a template: http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/arabbankmandamus.pdf), but it is certainly worth considering.
If such a move were successful, the whole case would be changed. If not, there would be no harm. Finally, taking Rochelle's assessment to its logical conclusion means that the maximum recovery for equity would be the $3B disgorgement (which I say is more likely in the vicinity of $1B - $1.5B), and would leave commons at the mercy of TPS' (the majority of the preferreds') mercy.
I don't know if this is something the EC has considered, but if it hasn't, it should.
La verdad que uno ya no sabe que pensar pero no me gusta mucho el hecho que Bopfan este actuando de esta manera como si deseara en realidad o pretendiera influir para que las comunes llegaran a valer nada.
Cierto es que yo viendo la que se estaba formando me deshice de las mias en la última subida pero hay que recordar que quien lleva las riendas de este caso es el EC y su Presidente tiene en cartera 1 millon de comunes compradas a $0.20.
¿porque desea Bopfan ahora presentar la posibilidad que las comunes valgan cero cuando antes las puso a multiplo de $$?
Este caso tiene a demasiados lobos con piel de cordero pero me parece que a ella se le esta empezando a ver el plumero... el hecho actual que solo lleve preferentes no significa que no me gustaría que otros inversores en comunes no terminen recibiendo algo significativo por 3 años de pelea constante. Si es así no creo que el EC aprobara un acuerdo que no incluyera a comunes y nos iriamos a litigar de todas todas.
¿que opinais vosotros?
