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Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños

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Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños
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Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños
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#22145

Re: Carta pública a Peg Brickley (Wall Street Journal)

Otra mentira más de los pumpers, NO hay nada en contra de JPM y FDIC en el proceso que desvele una posible recuperacion de capital por esa vía. Como de costumbre dan pistas falsas de lo que puede acontecer. La luchas esta entre TPS - EC - SNH. El resto de debtors estan al margen de dicha colusion con Rosen a la cabeza.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

#22147

Bopfan

Confirmation Denial: Where We Are; Part 2

Like every other equity holder I'm thrilled about last week's rulings, notwithstanding the court's decision to support the GSA.

I've been thinking about the decision and am convinced that the court's view that despite Stern she has authority to compromise certain claims in the GSA is erroneous. As the Willkie article points out she cites as authority (1) "established historical practice, currently recognized by Federal Bankruptcy Rule 9019, which is based on a similar provision of the Bankruptcy Act [and (2)] section 1123(b)(3)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, which states that a plan may provide for the settlement of any claim or interest, and further explained that confirmation of such a plan is within the Court’s core jurisdiction."

Her arguments are specious because she derives her power from Congress and Congress does not have jurisdiction over many of the types of claims the GSA envelopes. I can understand why Walrath is 'fighting' for her jurisdiction. The Supreme Court called the decision narrow, but it really isn't given what the court says about common law claims being the exclusive property of Article III courts. Walrath (and, doubtless, other bankruptcy courts) will seize on the word 'narrow' and proceed in rendering rulings until stopped by higher courts.

My guess is that TPS will appeal Walrath's interpretation of Stern; I don't think they will just sit pat and accept her holdings.

My other impression, which I think is shared by many here, is that the court is committed to resolving this mess with a true global understanding; hence her extraordinary pressure on the SNs. I also sense that she knows Weil is dirty (hence the sidelining of Weil) but isn't willing to blow up the case at this point. Either the SNs will give up value or it will be taken from them. What they yield, plus the value of the reorganized company will be for equity. Once value breaks through to equity I anticipate the EC threatening to propose a plan of its own since it will certainly have the power to reject v. 6. The price it will demand for keeping v.6 will be that JPM and the FDIC surrender value to the waterfall: specifically the tax refunds and, probably, JPM's assumption of TPS.

These demands are not unreasonable. The tax refunds don't appear on JPM's books (never have), so that money isn't coming out of Dimon's shareholders' pockets. As for assuming TPS, I understand these securities were previously protected by about $13B in mortgages. If that's so, even with refinancing at, say, 5%, JPM would generate $650MM annually, and assuming $4B in TPS @ about 8% is only $320MM.

If these concessions are the only impediments to a true GSA the court will probably nudge (if not shove) JPM because if the GSA is extinguished, so is her authority to compromise the underlying claims that she admits she can't adjudicate. Moreover, if the GSA dies the EC would be in a position to demand declaratory rulings on both the $4B deposit and the $6B or so in tax refunds because Stern does not defeat her jurisdiction over those issues. If the EC wins on both or on the $4B and most of the tax refunds, with the estate's obligations diminished by the SNs' disallowance (or settlement through mediation) and its resources increased by the FJR, the EC can cram down its plan anyway, and that plan would NOT include a compromise of the D.C. litigation against the FDIC and the business torts against JPM.

#22148

Me podríais recomendar?

Hola a todos forer@s e inversors de esta ruina de empresa.

Tengo una pregunta que haceros sobre que broker es el más seguro, que garantice los pagos, sea rápido y que si es posible ofrezca plataforma en tiempo real? Ah!! y que con todo esto sea económico?

Que brokers utilizais vosotros y que experiencias ofrecen?

Están en castellano o en inglés únicamente?

Muchas gracias y mucha suerte a todos, que creo que la merecemos por tanto aguante.

#22149

Re: Me podríais recomendar?

Yo te recomiendo interactivebrokers.com

Me gustan mucho. Tienen todo lo que puedas querer de un broker y son bastante económicos. Por ejemplo tienes acceso a tu cuenta via WEB, via TWS (un programa java), puedes acceder desde móviles Android o Blackberry (no tengo iPhone pero supongo que también), tienen APIS para que te programes lo que quieras... puedes hacerte un EXCEL que actualice los precios de tus acciones en tiempo real y que venda/compre cuando tú quieras...

Son una virguería. Todo en inglés, eso sí.

#22151

Interesante reflexión

There is a qualifier. If a deal is negotiated with equity prior to the end of the year, and equity includes existing commons at 50%+, this is less important. Equity "continuance" at 50%+ is an exception to the annual NOL use limitations of 382 also. There are reasons that one is better than the other, but in a pinch equity can work with either.

This seems to be still be a game factor as the MKT CAPS of the P, K versus Q support. The MKT indicates that if there is anything to be recovered by equity it will be through settlement that will include commons. The most obvious delivery method for settlement, of the few food items still on the table, is for the rework of the abandoned deal #1 of (1) the TPS preferreds, (2) purchase of NEWCO by equity at the new bankruptcy value of $210M and (3) cash settlement that accommodates (2) and provides cash for going forward.

The only ones with exposure are the SNHs and the NHs they can threat drag with them. Via the trump of the Hs, they upstream NEWCO to themselves and can use it to get it done. Whether they do it with equity or through the mediator, they'll want clean appearance and no admission of wrongdoing. Fried Frank are real good, so they will be head strong. But they need to have this hedge fund story line end.

Although I can't see any reason why JPM or the FDIC would even agree to be in the same building as equity or the SNHs, the only straw out there is if the US DOJ prevails in another Court that JPM is not the successor to WMB in the Anchor litigation award. If that is decided there, it would give JPM and the FDIC an excuse to put the Anchor settlement gross award back into the cash availability [unrelated to DIME LTW debt/breach case against the debtor]. It is a slight chance and short straw.

IMO, the biggest thorn to getting it done is TPS. They want nothing to do with the reorganized debtor if it has to give up it's large preferred control to common equity at 50%.

#22152

Re: Interesante reflexión

Reflexion incompleta y fantasiosa. FDIC y JP Morgan no van a ceder y menos ponerse en el bando de la equidad, sería como aceptar que la incautacion fue indebida. La llave para la equidad la posee solo la Juez que debe forzar a los SNH a ceder compensar economicamente a la equidad por el error cometido en el IT descubierto. Los precios de las acciones lo dicen todo, las comunes siguen en niveles bajisimos o sea NO RECIBIRAN NADA, en cuanto a la preferentes las P´s duplican su valor medio despues de la caida del informe del examiner, lo cual el mercado no le da de momento un valor importante hasta que se definan acontecimientos nuevos en relacion al GSA y despues de la mediacion.